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Regulation & Use of DNA Profiling in India 
* Rebant Juyal 
Abstract DNA profiling technology has brought about a paradigm shift in crime scene analysis. 
It has enabled criminal justice to exculpate the innocent and penalize the guilty successfully. 
However, to ensure the systematic use of DNA profiling technology, building an ecosystem 
regulating the use and application of DNA profiling is indispensable. It is therefore imperative to 
regulate human DNA profiling and limit its scope only for lawful purposes. The DNA Technology 
(Use and Application) Regulation Bill 2019 aims to regulate the use of DNA profiling technology 
in India. This article analyses the Bill and suggests proposals to reform the proposed legislation. 
1. Introduction 
DNA-based fingerprinting technology has transformed the Indian criminal investigation 
framework and added new frontiers to forensic investigations benefiting both the police and 
judicial administration. Since the 1980s after the first successful use of DNA fingerprinting,1 it has 
proved an invaluable tool to identify the guilty and absolve the innocent. The successful use of 
DNA technology has provided impetus to set up DNA databases in India,2 and incorporate relevant 
regulations. While it is imperative to institute a legal apparatus superintending DNA profiling, it 
is equally crucial to protect DNA data from being misused (by the State or others) to protect 
individuals’ right to privacy and personal liberty. Thus, the use of DNA profiling and the retention 
of DNA profiles must safeguard the privacy and liberty of the subject without jeopardising the 
privilege against self-incrimination.   
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1 Lady Justice Anne Rafferty DBE and Professor Niamh Nic Daeid FRSE, Forensic DNA Analysis: A Primer for 
Courts (1 edn, Royal Society of Edinburgh 2017) 7-19; Executive Office of the President President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology, ‘Report to The President Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring 
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2. DNA Fingerprinting 
DNA fingerprinting3 is a forensic methodology to identify persons by analysing the unique 
patterns within their DNA.4 99.9% of human DNA is the same5 while only 0.1% of DNA is 
distinctive to every individual, rendering it unique (with the exceptions of identical twins.6 These 
differences are caused by mutations occurring during evolution.7 By studying human genetic-
blueprint, DNA fingerprinting analyses human variability at the most fundamental level and has 
multifaceted advantages in criminal-investigations.8 For instance, by comparing the DNA of 
suspects with DNA evidence collected from the crime-scene, police can exonerate persons 
wrongly accused or convicted for an offence.9 Further, the technology helps to identify dead 
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or identity testing. Kara Rogers, ‘DNA fingerprinting’ (Britannica 2019) <https://www.britannica.com/science/DNA-
fingerprinting> accessed 20 December 2020; E Giardina, ‘DNA Fingerprinting’ in Stanley Maloy, Kelly Hughes 
(eds), Brenner's Encyclopedia of Genetics (2nd, Academic Press, 2013) 356. 
4 ‘What Is a DNA Fingerprint?’ (yourgenome June 2, 2016) <https://www.yourgenome.org/facts/what-is-a-dna-
fingerprint> accessed June 13, 2020; Stephen M Patton, ‘DNA Fingerprinting: The Castro Case’ [1990] 3(1) Harvard 
Journal of Law & Technology 224. 
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<https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/dna> accessed 24 January 2021. 
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William R. Wiebe, ‘DNA Identification Tests and the Courts’ [1988] 63(4) Washington Law Review 903-955; ‘DNA 
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bodies,10 disater victim identification (DVIs),11 and in solving biological parentage disputes,12 
agricultural-modernisation,13 analysing genetic-disorders;14 studying genetic-mutations,15 solving 
immigration issues16 and so on.17 This methodology has exemplified the persuasive influence of 
modern scientific evidence over criminal investigations. Its fidelity has thus catalysed the bid to 
store DNA data within the State and regulate human DNA fingerprinting.  
3. DNA profiling and the law: Constitutional and Legal Provisions 
The Indian Constitution is the fundamental legal document in India. It guarantees people’s 
Fundamental Rights under Part III to secure their human rights and fundamental freedoms.18 
Article 20(3) of the Constitution safeguards every individual from being a witness against 
himself.19 It epitomises the rule of protection against the compulsion of self-incrimination at the 
footing of the constitutional embargo. Further, Article 21 prohibits unauthorised intrusion or 
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16 Robin M White and Jeremy J D Greenwood, ‘DNA Fingerprinting and the Law’ [1988] 51(2) The Modern Law 
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Beyond)’ [2007] 8(2) Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 410; AJ Jeffreys and others, ‘Positive 
identification of an immigration test-case using human DNA fingerprints’ [1985] 317(6040) Nature 818-819. 
17 Ronald J Trent, ‘Forensic Science and Medicine’ Molecular Medicine: Genomics to Personalized Healthcare (4th, 
Academic Press, China 2012) 288-91; Human Genome Program, ‘Genomics and Its Impact on Science and Society’ 
(2008) U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science 7; Johanna K. Samuelsson and others, ‘DNA Fingerprinting 
Techniques for the Analysis of Genetic and Epigenetic Alterations in Colorectal Cancer’ [2010] 693(1-2) Mutation 
Research 61-76; Rana Saad, ‘Discovery, Development, and Current Applications of DNA Identity 
Testing’ [2005] 18(2) Baylor University Medical Center Proceedings 130-33. 
18 Constitution of India, Part III (Article 12-35). 





interference with the life and personal liberty of each person.20 In light of these provisions, the 
application of DNA profiling technology must pass the test and meet the standards provided under 
Article20(3) and 21 of the Constitution besides the golden triangle rule recognised under the 
Maneka Gandhi case.21  
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) under section 53 and 53-A establishes the legal 
framework for DNA profiling of subjects in criminal investigations.22 Section 53(1) provides for 
DNA profiling of the accused at the request of the Police. Section 53A also provides for DNA 
profiling of those accused of rape.23 The said section virtually re-enacts the legislative arrangement 
under S.53(1) explicitly for rape accused. DNA profiling of accused under CrPC does not 
contravene the Constitutional prohibition under Article 20(3) since it does not constitute 
compulsive self-incrimination.24 The Indian Evidence Act 1872, under sections 45-51, provides 
for the admissibility of expert opinion as a relevant fact in courts. An expert is a person who 
possesses some special knowledge or skills, based on his studies, training, or experience.25 The 
expert opinion rule enacts exceptional legislative sub-structure to evidentiary jurisprudence. 
Personal opinions or beliefs of the experts are irrelevant. The rationale behind the exception is 
based on the doctrine of necessity, involving questions surpassing the scope of common 
knowledge or necessitating special knowledge, study or experience.26 Thus, where the subjected 
inquiry requires the application of science (like DNA testing) in such fashion that a person having 
no previous knowledge or experience is unable to form the correct opinion, Courts will consider 
expert opinions to form righteous judgement over the subjected inquiry.  
However, though, the Criminal Procedure Code and Evidence Act grants statutory 
recognition and admissibility in courts to DNA profiling in India the two statutes fail to provide 
an adequate regulatory framework.  
 
20 The Constitution of India, Article 21, “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according 
to procedure established by law”. 
21 (1987) 1 SCC 248: AIR 1987 SC 597. 
22 Code of Criminal Procedure1973, s.53(2)(a). 
23 Code of Criminal Procedure1973, s.53A(1) & (2). 
24 Anil A. Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra, 1981 Cri LJ  125, 130 (Bom); Anath Kumar Naik v. State of A.P., 
1977(AP); Jamshed v. State of U.P.,1976 Cri LJ 1680(All.). See also RV Kelkar and KN Chandrasekharan Pillai, RV 
Kelkar's Lectures on Criminal Procedure (6th edn., Eastern Book Company 2017) 36. 
25 State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jai Lal and Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 280 [13]. 
26 Chief Justice M Monir and Dr. Shakil Ahmad Khan, Textbook on The Law of Evidence (10th edn, Universal Law 





3.1 DNA Evidence: Admissibility 
DNA Profiling is revered as an authoritative technique equipped to distinguish and identify 
people.27 DNA evidence has attained an appropriate legal position in the operation of justice.28 It 
is not simply a methodology for deduction, but an approach for clear discernment.29 Its resultant 
analysis provides high thresholds of proof required by courts to free a factually innocent person.30 
The Indian Supreme Court judged DNA profiling as an extremely reliable technique to 
compare suspect DNA with specimens collected at the crime-scene.31 The Court in Sharda v. 
Dharmpal32 ruled that a matrimonial court has the power to order a person to undergo a medical 
test, which does not violate Article 21 of the Constitution. The court can draw adverse inferences 
against the respondent when he or she refuses to submit himself to medical examination under the 
direction of the court.33 Further, in the case of Surendra Koli v. State of Uttar Pradesh,34 while 
confirming the death sentence of the appellant, the Court showed reliance on DNA evidence. The 
Court in Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi)35 ruled that: 
 
27 A. Raghunadha Reddy, ‘From Jurisprudence to Jurimetrics: A Critical Evaluation of the Emerging Tools in the 
Judicial Process’ [2009] 51 JILI 99; Michael lynch, ‘God’s signature: DNA profiling, the new gold standard in 
forensic science' [2003] 27(2) Endeavour; Raghuvir Desai v. State 2007 Cri LJ 829; Turbak G, “Justice Through 
Genes” [1991] The Rotarian 23; V. Sithannan, Police Investigation - Powers, Tactics and Techniques (Jeywin 
Publishers 2014)151; David P. Clark and Nanette Jean Pazdernik, “Forensic Molecular Biology,” Biotechnology: 
Academic Cell Update (2nd edn. Academic Cell Press 2016). 
28 David H. Kaye, ‘DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the Courts’ [1993] 7 Harvard Journal of 
Law & Technology; R. Granja, H. Machado, DNA Technologies in Criminal Investigation and Courts. in Helena 
Machado and Rafaela Granja (eds), Forensic Genetics in the Governance of Crime (Palgrave Pivot 2020). 
29 See People v. Wesley 73 N.Y. 2d 351 (1989) [308]; Williams v. Illinois 132 S. Ct. 2221: 183 L.Ed. 2d. 89 (2012) 
[3-4].See also C Thomas Blair, ‘Spencer v Commonwealth and Recent Developments in the Admissibility of DNA 
Fingerprint Evidence’ [1990] 76(4) Virginia Law Journal 853; Dr. V Nageswara Rao, The Indian Evidence Act-A 
Critical Commentary Covering Emerging Issues and International Development (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2015) 463; 
Coleman Howard and Swenson Eric, DNA in Court Room: A Trial Watcher's Guide (1st edn, Gene Lex Press 1994) 
5. 
30 Mukesh Kumar Malviya, ‘DNA Fingerprinting as an Evidence and Role of Indian Supreme Court’ [2017] 1(2) IJCF 
40; Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the Legal Process’ [2006] 34(2) The Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics 332; National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence (1st edn, National 
Academic Press 1996) 2; Ricardo Fontg, ‘DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide to Admissibility and 
Use’ [1992] 57(2) Missouri Law Review 507. See also Victor Walter Weedn and John W Hicks, ‘The Unrealized 
Potential of DNA Testing’ [1997] (234) National Institute of Justice Journal. 
31 Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 673 [85]. 
32 AIR 2003 SC 3450. See also Rohit Shekhar v. Narayan Dutt Tiwari MANU/DE/3701/2010:2011 (121) DRJ 563; 
Shankar @ Palanisamy v. State by Inspector of Police MANU/TN/1736/2009; Veeran v. Veeravarmalle & Anr. AIR 
2009 Mad. 64. 
33 ibid. para 86. 
34 (2011) 4 SCC 80. 





 “DNA evidence is being increasingly relied upon by courts. After the amendment 
in the Criminal Procedure Code by the insertion of Section 53A by Act 25 of 2005, 
DNA profiling has now become a part of the statutory scheme.36 (…) DNA 
evidence is now a predominant forensic technique for identifying criminals 
(…).37” 
3.2 DNA Profiling Regulation: Law Commission Recommendations 
The Indian Law Commission in its 271st report in 2017 recommended  introducing specific 
legislation to regulate DNA Profiling in India.38 It was titled, ‘Human DNA Profiling – A draft 
Bill for the Use and Regulation of DNA-Based Technology’.39 The report recommended to 
institute a special DNA regulation to regulate human DNA profiling (including standards and 
quality controls) and restrict it only for purposes provided by law. It noted that a possible misuse 
of human DNA profiling is detrimental to society. Thus, it concluded that merely amending the 
Criminal Code would not be adequate and that special legislation to prevent such abuse was 
necessary.40 Therefore,  the report recommended the DNA Profiling Bill to ensure that modern 
DNA Profiling technology is regulated and restricted to the purposes enumerated in law.41  
3.3 DNA Technology (Use and Regulation) Bill, 2019 
The DNA Technology (Use and Regulation) Bill, 2019 (henceforth referred to as “the 
Bill”) was tabled before the Union Parliament following the Law Commission report.42 The Bill 
aims to regulate, control and limit DNA profiling for identification of individuals only to matters 
provided in law. It proposes to employ DNA fingerprinting for DVI, recognising unknown dead 
bodies and offenders of specific offences listed in the Bill.43 
3.3.1 DNA Regulatory Board 
 
36 ibid. para 213. 
37 Justice Bhanumati Judgment, ibid. para 87. 
38 Law Commission of India, Human DNA Profiling – A Draft Bill for The Use and Regulation Of DNA-Based 
Technology (Report No.271, 2017). 
39 ibid. 
40 Law Commission Report (n 39) Ch.1 para 1.9. 
41 ibid. 
42 Press release, ‘The DNA Technology (Use and Application) Regulation Bill – 2019 Introduced in Lok Sabha’ (Press 
Information Bureau, 8 July 2019) <https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1577738> accessed 27 January 
2021. 
43 Department of Biotechnology, ‘DNA Profiling Bill’ (Dbtindia.gov.in, 2020) <http://dbtindia.gov.in/regulations-





The Bill proposes to constitute a DNA regulatory board, as a body corporate.44 It grants 
the Board regulatory, advisory, and supervisory statutory powers to regulate DNA Profiling, DNA 
laboratories and other entities under the Bill.45 
3.3.2 DNA Data Bank 
Chapter V of the Bill outlays the statutory framework for DNA data banks.46 It prescribes 
to establish a national DNA data bank at the centre and regional data banks at the state level to 
store DNA profiles, which will be maintained by the governments of the respective jurisdictions.47 
These banks act as a repository for  all collected DNA samples.48 Regional data banks are 
mandated to share the information stored by them with National data bank.49 The Bill also proposes 
to maintain indexes for different categories of data in DNA data banks.50 Besides, it prescribes to 
remove the DNA profiles of undertrials pursuant to a court direction,51 those of accused upon the 
filing of a police report or court order and those of others upon their written request.52  
3.3.3 Use and Collection of DNA Data 
The Bill limits the use of DNA data (stored in DNA banks and laboratories) for establishing 
the identity of the person and restricts its applicability only for matters listed in the Bill. 53 Chapter 
VI enumerates provisions to protect and maintain secrecy and security of DNA profiles. It 
provisions to collect bodily substances from the person and lists other sources for collection of 
DNA samples.54 It stipulates written consent before collection of bodily substances from the 
arrested person, except for specified offences.55 
 
44 DNA Technology (Use and Regulation) Bill, s 3 
 <https://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/Committee_site/Committee_File/BillFile/Bill/14/126/DNAbill.pdf> accessed 26 
January, 2021. 
45 ibid. s 12. 
46 Investigating agencies preserve DNA samples as DNA Profiles at designated places, called DNA Data banks. It acts 
as the library of DNA samples, extracted from people, or gathered from crime-sites. DNA Data banks are used for 
criminal-identification where crime-scene DNA evidence is traceable, but the suspect remains untraceable. The 
extracted DNA sample from crime-site is analyzed, with DNA Profiles stored in such banks.                                                                    
47 DNA Bill (n 44) s25(1). 
48 ibid s 25(2) and (3). 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid. s 26(1). 
51 ibid. s 31(2). 
52 ibid. s 31(2) and (3). 
53 ibid. s 2(viii), s33,34 and Schedule. 
54 ibid.s 2(1)(ii) and s23(1). 





3.3.4 DNA Laboratories 
The Bill provides for mandatory accreditation of DNA testing Laboratories.56 It proposes 
to authorize the DNA Regulatory Board to grant and revoke accreditations of DNA labs.57 It further 
institutes duty over DNA laboratories  to meet specified standars of quality control, infrastructure 
for DNA testing, security, and maintenance of DNA data records. 
4. DNA Technology (Use & Application) Bill: Analysis and Recommendations  
India is a constitutional democracy where legislature exercises, its legislative powers 
within the demarcated constitutional framework. The constitution recognises certain fundamental 
and inalienable principles as fundamental rights, which act as a restrain over legislative powers of 
the legislature. These principles are inviolable and beyond the pale of legislative majorities.58 
Thus, it is a constitutional necessity that legislation must not violate the wide gamut of fundamental 
rights.  
The DNA Technology Bill  a proposed legislative instrument; to regulate the use of DNA 
Profiling Technology for limited purposes over restricted matters, aims to streamline DNA 
fingerprinting technology in India. It objectifies to facilitate the empowerment and advancement 
of effective administration of justice through optimum use of DNA profiling. However, the Bill 
lacks few fundamentally critical safeguards necessary to protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed under the Indian Constitution as fundamental rights. 
4.1 DNA Profiling and Threat to Privacy 
One of the most critical issues touching the Bill is the transgression into the privacy of 
people it can cause. Since, what is at stake, is the genetic privacy of people living in a constitutional 
democracy. DNA profiling or fingerprinting cannot be regarded as a mere modernised and 
advanced methodology of conventional fingerprinting.59 Fingerprints and palmprints usage in 
forensics are limited to identification only.60 While DNA profiling permits identification; it also 
 
56 ibid. s 15. 
57 ibid. s 14, 15. 
58 Justice KS Puttaswamy (retired) v. Union of India AIR 2017 SC 4161[153]. 
59 Tania Simoncelli and Barry Steinhardt, 'California’s Proposition 69: A Dangerous Precedent for Criminal DNA 
Databases ' [2005] 33(2) The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 288. 
60 Linda Bartusiak, ‘Plea Bargaining For DNA: Implications on The Right to Privacy’ [2011] 13(4) Journal of 





provides sensitive information about a person’s race;61 family history;62 predisposition to various 
diseases and allergies;63 appearance; behavioural traits;64and legitimacy of birth.65 Scientists claim 
that DNA may also be able to shed light on a person’s aggression;66 substance addiction; criminal 
tendency,67 and sexual orientation.68 In that sense, access to such intrusive genetic information 
may be abused by someone to attack people, including their families.69 Furthermore, DNA analysis 
can lead to caste or religion-based profiling since specific caste or religious groups could be 
wrongly associated with criminal activities or subjected to other predudices. Moreover, future 
technological advances in DNA profiling might enable scientists to mine greater and more specific 
information about a person.70 To summerise, DNA testing technology has critical ramifications 
over the privacy of Indian citizens, since exploitation of the technology can yield an explosion of 
sensitive information about the person’s genetic makeup which should remain discreet. 71 
 
61 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Note on DNA Testing to Establish Family Relationships in the 
Refugee Context (UNHCR 2008); Jonathan Kahn, ‘Race, Genes, and Justice: A Call to Reform the Presentation of 
Forensic DNA Evidence in Criminal Trials’ [2008] 74(2) Brooklyn Law Review 325-375. 
62 Erica Haimes, ‘Social and Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial Searching in Forensic Investigations: Insights from 
Family and Kinship Studies’ [2006] 34(2) The Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics; Erin Murphy, ‘Relative Doubt: 
Familial Searches of DNA Databases’ [2010] 109(3) Michigan Law Review 321; 
63 Denise R Ferrier, Biotechnology and Human Disease. in Richard A Harvey (ed), Lippincott’s Illustrated Reviews: 
Biochemistry (Lippincott Williams & Wilkins 2014). 
64 Pamela Sankar, ‘The Proliferation and Risks of Government DNA Databases’ [1997] 87(3) American Journal of 
Public Health 336; Paul S Appelbaum and Nicholas Scurich, ‘Impact of Behavioral Genetic Evidence on the 
Adjudication of Criminal Behavior’ [2014] 42(1) The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. 
65 Tania Simoncelli, ‘Dangerous Excursions: The Case Against Expanding Forensic DNA Databases to Innocent 
Persons’ [2006] 34(2) The Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics 391-392; Patricia A Roche and George J 
Annas, 'Protecting Genetic Privacy’ [2001] 2(5) Nature Reviews Genetics; Aziza Ahmed, ‘Ethical Concerns of DNA 
Databases used for Crime Control’ (Bill of Health, Harvard Law School, 14 January 
2019) <https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/14/ethical-concerns-of-dna-databases-used-for-crime-
control/> accessed 27 February 2021. See also RM Andrews and others, ‘Reanalysis and revision of the Cambridge 
reference sequence for human mitochondrial DNA’ [1999] 23(2) Nature Genetics 147. 
66 Mairi Levitt and Elisa Pieri, ‘It Could Just Be an Additional Test Couldn't It?’ Genetic testing for susceptibility to 
aggression and violence’ [2009] 28(2) New Genetics and Society; Virginia Morell, ‘Evidence Found for a Possible 
'Aggression Gene'’ [1993] 260(5115) Science. 
67 Christopher Lean Allan Mccay, ‘Cousin took a DNA test? Courts Could Use It to Argue You are More Likely to 
Commit Crimes’ (The Conversation, 21st January) <https://theconversation.com/cousin-took-a-dna-test-courts-
could-use-it-to-argue-you-are-more-likely-to-commit-crimes-129976#:~:text=Genealogy> accessed 28 January 
2021. 
68 Plea Bargaining (n 61); Andelka M Phillips, ‘Take an Online DNA Test and You Could Be Revealing Far More 
Than You Realise’ (University of Oxford, 16 January 2016) <https://www.ox.ac.uk/research/take-online-dna-test-
and-you-could-be-revealing-far-more-you-realise> accessed 28 January 2021. See also Maya Sabatello and Paul S 
Appelbaum, ‘Behavioral Genetics in Criminal and Civil Courts’ [2017] 25(6) Harvard Review of Psychiatry. 
69 Read Samuel Hodge, ‘Current Controversies in the Use of DNA in Forensic Investigations’ [2018] 48(1) University 
of Baltimore Law Review 49. 
70 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Forensic Use of Bioinformation: Ethical Issues (Cambridge Publishers 
Ltd 2007). 
71 Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Review of the Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000, Report No.18 





Therefore, the intersection between the DNA Technology Bill and individual privacy warrants 
careful examination. 
4.1.1 Right to Privacy 
The Supreme Court recognised the Right to Privacy as an inherent right under Article 21 
of the Constitution72 in Justice KS Puttaswamy (retired) v Union of India73 The infusion of the 
constitutional element to the Right to Privacy grants individual privacy with immunity from 
legislative majorities. Any intrusion to individual privacy would, thus infringe protection under 
Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, the State has a restricted sphere to abridge into the 
privacy of an individual,as sanctions legislative or otherwise sanctioning individual privacy 
infringement will be as per constitutional standards established under the Maneka Gandhi74 case. 
The Court ruled that law depriving a person of his ‘personal liberty’ has not only to stand the test 
of Article 21 but, also Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.75 
To that sense,Therefore to ingress into the genetic privacy of an individual (i.e., to use 
DNA for fingerprinting or store DNA profiles) all tests put forth under Article 14, 19 and 21 of 
the constitution need to be satisfied. It is necessary to ensure that 
 There is a procedure established by law for DNA profiling. 
 The procedure established by law is just, fair, and reasonable. 
 The legislative provisions imposed by the enactment must be 
proportionate to the objectives of the Act. Thus, there must be an 
intelligible differentia over the class created with a reasonable nexus for 
the purpose to achieve. 
However, the proposed legislative formulation censoriously erodes the above proposition 
of Constitutional Jurisprudence, imperative to deprive anyone of his personal liberty amounting to 
 
Council, DNA Technology in Forensic Science (The National Academies Press 1992) 18; Khaleda Parven, ‘Forensic 
Use of DNA Information v. Human Rights and Privacy Challenges’ [2013] 17(41) University of Western Sydney Law 
Review 50. 
72 Fundamental Right to Life and Personal Liberty. 
73 [2017] 10. SCC 1 (SC): AIR 2017 SC 4161. 
74 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597. 
75 ibid; ML Upadhyava, ‘Role of the Supreme Court with regard to the Right to the Life and Personal 
Liberty’ [1992] 34(4) JILI 606; Sujit Ghosh, 'Overview and Architecture of the Indian Constitutional 
Arrangement' (National Judicial Academy, 17 March 2018) <http://www.nja.nic.in/Concluded_Programmes/2017-





severe violation of the Right to Privacy. Such violations within the proposed statutory format, are 
discussed as below: 
4.1.1.1 Retention of DNA Profiles in Civil Disputes 
The Bill proposes to collect and retain DNA profiles of people for different offences 
including civil disputes and civil matters.76 However,  the state cannot collect and store DNA 
samples from such a large category of people under the DNA data banks after the recognition of 
the Right to Privacy as a fundamental right. Undoubtedly, retention of the DNA of an individual 
curtails his Right to Privacy. Thus, to implement the proposed legislative scheme and pass the test 
of Article 14, the Bill must create a reasonable classification of those, whose DNA is to be stored, 
through intelligible differentiation, with a rational nexus over the object it seeks to achieve.77 
Besides, the principal objective for retaining DNA profiles of offenders in DNA data banks 
is to accelerate crime detection and improve the administration of justice in India. Therefore, the 
scope of DNA retention (in cases of offenders) must be restricted to only those cases with high 
probability of re-offending. However, the Bill proposes to store DNA of a large category of people 
(civil offenders; parties in a paternity dispute; civil disputes etc). It would be unreasonable to 
envisage that a party in these cases would commit a criminal offence. Not even an iota of this 
probability arises in such instances. Stating that a party to a civil dispute or others may commit a 
criminal act in the future and thus that their DNA profile must be stored, would be against the 
fundamental policy of Indian law,78 and defy the reasonable character of the Bill. It would seriously 
infringe the Right to Privacy of such people. To qualify the test of Article 14 a law must adopt 
proportionate means to accomplish a legitimate aim in the public interest. However, in the given 
instance, the Bill fails to create an intelligible differentia of such people whose privacy may be 
intruded upon, with reasonable nexus of achieving the objectives enumerated within the Bill. 
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International instruments, to which India is a party like the UDHR, 79 ICCPR, 80 guarantee 
the Right to Privacy. Article 17 of the ICCPR guarantees the Right to Privacy of the citizens of 
member states. Therefore, to comply with the commitments of India ratified by the Union 
Parliament,81 the Bill should affirm the standards provided under the ICCPR for intrusion into 
genetic privacy. The proposed DNA legislation for DNA storage should limit the gathering and 
storage of information to ‘authorised interferences’ mandated under the covenant. The interference 
into the privacy of the person must be proportional to  the interest of society.  It must be reasonable 
and not violative of the ICCPR.82 The proposal of storing DNA of people involved in civil disputes 
and other such cases defies the scope of reasonable restrictions and authorised interferences over 
the Right to Privacy of people. Retention of profiles must have reasonable-nexus with intelligible 
differentia to intrude into the fundamental right to privacy. Thus, considering the gravity & nature 
of the crime and criminal while instituting the legislative policy over retention of DNA Profiles is 
imperative. DNA Profiles must be retained, only for those offences, where there is a high 
probability of the offence being committed again by the same person. 
4.1.1.2 Unified DNA Databases for Civil and Criminal Offence  
The Bill does not propose any separate index to preserve DNA profiles for civil offenders, 
consequently, profiles of civil offenders shall be retained abreast of those of the criminal offenders. 
Though, as already discussed, that retention of DNA profiles in civil cases is plainly 
unconstitutional, considering the Right to Privacy and golden triangle rule. However, irrespective 
of the above proposition, unified retention of DNA profiles censoriously outrages the personal 
autonomy of the civil offender. The Supreme Court ruled in Selvi v. State of Karnataka83 that 
interferences with an individual's personal autonomy violates the right to privacy.84 The unified 
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database would obscure the fine difference between guilt and innocence. It would provide for 
cross-referencing of DNA profiles for civil and criminal cases even without the consent, 
knowledge and information of the person, which indisputably amounts to self-incrimination. DNA 
analysis of an individual is not less than the person’s submission, since it provides most intrusive 
information about the person. Thus, extracting genetic information or cross-referencing the DNA 
profile of a person (whose  genetic information was takenfor a civil matter but their profile is later 
cross-matched for a criminal case) without their acquiescence, erodes the constitutional protection 
against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution. Therefore, it is a 
constitutional necessity and obligation for the state to ensure that separate civil and criminal 
databases will be maintained. 
4.1.1.3 Information Stored in DNA Profiles of Different Indices 
The Bill fails to impose a restriction on the exact information to be extracted to create the 
DNA profile of different indices in DNA data banks.85 For instance, the unidentified deceased 
person index will just require physical reconstruction of person, unlike the crime scene index, 
wherein two different DNA samples may have to be matched. By failing to limit the information 
a DNA profile may contain in different indices, many people can be susceptible to profiling, based 
on their skin colour, disabilities, medical conditions and so on.  These profiles may be misused for 
surveillance as well as private purposes. Thus, it will additionally violate the fundamental right to 
privacy of such people. This concern is apparent in the schedule of the Bill, where the government 
wants to create DNA profiles for issues relating to pedigree, emigration and immigration.86  
Furthermore, the Bill must not include a crime scene index, suspect index and undertrial 
index. Rather, indices to be maintained must include offenders index consisting of DNA profiles 
of criminal offenders (subject to the nature and gravity of the crime and criminal). There appears 
to be no necessity of these indices in light of the existing jurisprudence on the Right to Privacy. 
The threat with a crime scene index remains that it will virtually encompass every DNA profile 
including DNA left at the crime site before or after the crime, of people having nothing to do with 
the crime. Further bodily material belonging to individuals absent from the crime site might be 
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moved to the crime location coincidentally in different forms. Many such profiles will be thus 
preserved in databanks, even without the knowledge of the individuals. 
While, suspect, undertrial and crime scene DNA profiles can be used in investigation and 
trial, they should not be stored in databanks and must be destroyed pursuant to the conclusion of 
the case with the acquittal. In case of the conviction, only the DNA profile of the convict shouldbe 
preserved in the databank. There appears to be the risk of indexing DNA profiles of non-convicts 
(in form of suspects, undertrials and crime scene) in databanks. Retention of such profiles with the 
state has the potential to cause irreparable damage to the privacy of  Indian citizens. Thus, the Bill 
must  provide for an offender index, (instead of the other three indices) where the DNA profiles of 
only the offenders would be retained. 
4.1.1.4 Preserving DNA Profiles  
DNA Profiling use under the Bill is not limited to crime-identification,  as it includes 
identifying DVIs, unknown dead bodies and so on. However, the issue involves storing DNA 
profiles of people, amounting to infringement of their Right to Privacy. Though DNA profiling is 
advantageous in establishing people’s identity, the advantage of DNA data banks in cases other 
than criminal and missing person identification is not efficacious. Thus, retaining DNA profiles in 
DNA banks of a large category of people (civil offender, parties in a paternity dispute, non-
convicts, suspects, undertrials, voluntary submissions) can make sensitive genetic information of 
innocents vulnerable to surveillance. Further, the possible threat of state invasion into genetic 
privacy of people and the damage to democratic fabrics of the country through fear of genetic-
surveillance outweighs the merits of the Bill. Therefore, retention of DNA profiles in DNA data 
banks must remain restricted to limited cases of criminal offences (retention of profile pursuant to 
conviction) and in cases of missing of a person. However,  in other instances, DNA profiling could 
be used for identification only, as a matter of legislative policy, but their retention would be 
violative of right to privacy and not in the public interest.  
4.1.1.5 Absence of Data Protection Bill  
The DNA Technology Bill is nearly identical to the Bill drafted by the law commission in 





case.87 Hence, the Bill was not drafted through the lens of ‘right to privacy’. Thus, it becomes 
necessary to bring the proposed legislation in alignment with the standards laid down in the 
Puttaswamy judgment. In this context, it is appropriate to reiterate the notion of common legal 
jurisprudence that laws supplement fundamental rights through statutory frameworks. Statutory 
regulations act as an extended arm of the constitutional safeguards accorded to people. Under this 
circumstance,  to bring the privacy judgment into operation it is necessary to enact a robust Data 
Protection Law. It would establish a foundational statutory framework to protect individual 
privacy, mandating other laws to align with that framework. 
Further, the right to forget is also a recognised facet of the right to privacy (the Karnataka 
High court recognised the limited application of this right).88 However, the Bill fails to guarantee 
this facet of the privacy right. Whereas, the Data Protection Bill (a proposed Bill) proposes to grant 
‘right to be forgotten’. 89 Thus, laws that have any bearing over the right to privacy must be enacted 
only after a robust Data Protection Law has been enacted. The latter would provide a mechanism 
for enforcement of privacy rights, grievance redressal and independent oversight (through data 
protection authority proposed under the Bill). Sanctioning the state to store DNA profiles of people 
in the absence of any overarching statutory protection on individual privacy and data security 
would have critical ramifications over the privacy and personal liberty of the people of India. 
Therefore, the Bill must be enacted only after a robust Data Protection Law. 
4.1.1.6 Elucidate Responsibility  
The Bill must incorporate express legal provisions, reflecting the obligations of the DNA 
laboratories necessary to preserve the secrecy and security of DNA profiles. It must prohibit DNA 
laboratories from storing a copy of DNA profiles. Further, the Bill prohibits to initiate legal 
proceedings against the Union government or member of Board and Banks for actions done in 
good faith. 90 However, the Bill does not define the meaning and scope of good faith, even though 
it seems critical to define contours of good faith to ensure the  provision is not misused.  
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4.1.1.7 DNA Data Storage in Cases of Premature Release of the Convict 
The Supreme Court in Life Convict Laxman Naskar v. State of Bengal91 listed the following 
questions and guidelines with respect to the premature release of convicts:92 
 Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting society 
at large. 
 Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict anymore. 
 Whether there is any chance of reoffending. 
 Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing a crime. 
 The socio-economic condition of the convict’s family. 
These guidelines were later incorporated into rules to prescribe the premature release of 
convicts. The Supreme Court judgment-based Delhi Prisons Rules, provides for early release of 
prisoners upon consideration of their becoming harmless to society.93 Rule 1251(a) provides for 
the release of the life term convict when convict loses the potential to commit a crime.94 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court directives, resulting in the genesis of these rules, provide as 
essential ‘whether there is any chance of future reoccurrence of committing a crime’. Thus, when 
the state certifies a prisoner to be harmless to society, it accredits that they have lost the potential 
to commit a crime by virtue of authorising the premature release. Then, why should the genetic 
data of such persons be stored in DNA data banks? Does the loss of potential to commit a crime 
and transformation of the criminal to being harmless to society not obliterate the criminal potential 
of the person? The reformative theory of punishment aims to reform the criminal and 
metamorphose the criminal into a law-abiding citizen.95The foundational roots of  Indian criminal 
jurisprudence embody that pursuant to the release of a convict (including premature release) he 
must be treated as an innocent person like every other individual in society. The DNA profile of 
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such people must be removed automatically from DNA data banks, since their potential to commit 
crimes has already been invigorated as provided in the law. The European Human Rights Court of 
Appeal ruled in S and Marper v. United Kingdom,96 that storage of DNA profile of a person against 
whom the criminal proceedings have ended violates Article 8 of the European Convention on 
HumanRights.97 In the context of the DNA Bill, retaining the DNA profile of criminals granted 
premature release under the law would correspond to gross violation of their fundamental right to 
life and personal liberty. 
Further, even from a practical point of view, only those DNA profiles should be stored, 
which will benefit the agencies in future investigations. Retaining DNA profiles in cases where 
there is satisfactory reasoning or evidence before the police administration that the offender shall 
not be committing any offence, will  be a futile exercise and will be of no use for the system. Such 
measures would only burden the public exchequer. Thus, the state must retain DNA profiles, only 
after considering the nature of the crime and of the criminal and the other factors considered 
relevant by the legislation. 
4.2 Protection to Person’s Consent for Extraction of DNA Sample 
The Bill does not define consent and fails to guarantee free and informed consent for the 
collection of bodily samples for DNA extraction. It stipulates a scheme where individual consent 
to provide bodily substances to extract the DNA is documented in absence of the magistrate. The 
person’s consent under such a framework can be obtained through force or other coercive forms 
and may harm individual liberty. Thus, it is necessary to safeguard the voluntary and well-
informed nature of the provision of consent.  
The Supreme Court established, in Selvi v. State of Tamil Nadu,98 the requirement of 
safeguards that secure the free and informed consent of the person and the administering of 
forensic techniques.99 The Bill, therefore, must define the term ‘consent’ to establish appropriate 
standards for the provision of effective free and informed consent. It must incorporate provisions 
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to ensure that a person’s consent for sample collection is recorded before the magistrate. Moreover, 
it must provide for a notice to be sent to the subject before its DNA sample collection and give 
time to the subject to seek for judicial protection against the notice. The Bill must impose 
responsibility on the magistrate to inform the person about the possible usage of his DNA profile 
while recording his consent for bodily sample extraction. 
Further, the Bill grants wide discretionary power to the magistrate to override the 
individual’s refusal to consent under the Act.100 It must enlist guiding factors based on which the 
magistrate would exercise its power to override the refusal. The legislature must provide for all 
possible steps to ensure no room for uninformed or ambiguous consent under the Bill. The current 
scheme of obtaining assent for sample collection fails to protect the fundamentals of protection 
necessary to ensure free, fair, voluntary, and informed consent. It fails to provide minimum 
essential rights to guarantee free, fair, voluntary, and informed consent. Such a procedure could 
be easily misused to intrude over the rights and privacy interests of individuals. 
4.2.1 Constitutionality of the Procedure for Recording Consent under the Act 
The Supreme Court in Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of 
Delhi,101 ruled that the right to life and personal liberty also includes the right to human dignity: 
“We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity (…) 
Every act which offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro 
tanto of this right to live (…). Now obviously, any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment would be offensive to human dignity and (…) be prohibited by Article 
21 unless it is in accordance with procedure prescribed by law, but no law which authorises 
and no procedure which leads to such torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can 
ever stand the test of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness: it would plainly be 
unconstitutional and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21.”102  
After studying the above directive of the Supreme Court in the Selvi case, it becomes 
obligatory for the Bill to establish adequate safeguards ensuring voluntary, free, fair, and informed 
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consent of the person to use his DNA fingerprint. Absence of adequate legislative safeguards 
violates the reasonable, fair, and just character of the procedure required by law. Consequently, 
failing the test Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution amounts to gross erosion of the 
right to human dignity and the constitutional-proscription against self-incrimination. In a 
constitutionally democratic fraternity-like India, the procedure established by law cannot sanction 
collection and retention (including profiling) of the DNA of people (their genetic identity) without 
safeguarding individual-consent effectively. A procedure established by law, establishing such an 
open-ended statutory framework, where the fear of obtaining anyone’s consent for DNA extraction 
through coercive means clearly reflects on statutory provisions, evidently fails the test of 
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness, amounting to the violation of fundamental rights. It would 
additionally amount to self-incrimination which would violate the Indian Constitution. 
Right to privacy acknowledges freedom from intrusion, surveillance, and interference with 
matters which an individual would not like others to know. 103 Thus, in a constitutionally 
safeguarded country like India, every individual protectorsee of the fundamental right to human 
dignity and privacy has an inherent right to secure a free; fair, and informed consent for extraction 
of bodily substances for DNA profiling. Obtaining persons’ assent for extracting their genetic 
blueprint through coercive means patently amounts to flagrant intrusion into the genetic privacy 
of the people and erodes the fundamental right to human dignity (since it amounts to degrading 
treatment) and personal liberty as well as the right against self-incrimination. Moreover, the 
extraction of DNA evidence without procedural fairness infringesthe Rule of Law, thereby 
rendering the evidence illegal and inadmissible in  court.   
Furthermore, the Puttaswamy judgment acknowledges the right of a person to control the 
use and propagation or dissemination of his personal information.104 There is absolute clarity over 
the fact that the DNA sample of a person constitutes personal information. Thus, if an individual 
gives consent for DNA profiling of his DNA, his DNA profile cannot be used for purposes other 
than for those for which the consent was given. Any attempt of using the personal information of 
an individual without his permission would contravene the right to privacy and the right against 
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self-incrimination of such individual.105 It is highly unpredictable and unreasonable to expect from 
an ordinary person submitting bodily samples to know the future implications and usage of his 
consent. The Bill must provide a mechanism whereby an individual has the right to know how, 
when and where his DNA profile will be used. 
Further, there must be an express legislative embargo over the usage of an individual’s 
DNA profile by any authority without his consent, which could only be revoked following a court 
order. The legislature is constitutionally obligated to ensure that the procedure established by law 
for collecting bodily samples conforms to the Supreme Court ruling in the Selvi case. Thus, without 
the person’s consent, the state must not extract theirDNA and use theirDNA profiles for analysis 
or in any manner, without due authorisation each time. 
Obtaining consent and collection of bodily samples must conform to the standards of the 
right to human dignity. Absence of legislative safeguards ensuring free, fair, voluntary and well-
informed consent would amount to gross violation of the right to human dignity and personal 
liberty guaranteed under the Constitution. The Bill, therefore, must incorporate necessary 
provisions to mandate the enforcement agencies to inform the subject about the details of the 
collection and usage of his DNA. Every person must have both an effective right to refrain from 
giving his bodily sample and an entitlement to challenge the order for bodily sample collection 
before a court of law. 
4.2.1.1 Constitutional Permissibility of Consent for DNA Sample Collection 
Though, the legislative instruments and courts in India validate the collection of DNA 
evidence from the subject in specific cases. However, such authorisations were commanded before 
recognition of the right to privacy, as a fundamental right by the Supreme Court of India. 
Recognition of the right to privacy has changed the parameters concerning the admissibility 
of DNA evidence and extraction of DNA samples from an individual.  Whenever any person gives 
his DNA (through bodily sample or otherwise) to another person, he virtually submits his genetic 
code at the receiver’s disposal. Submission of one’s genetic blueprint to another person plainly 
amounts to infringement of right to privacy. The state can deprive the right to privacy of any person 
 





by following the procedure established by law;106 such procedure established by law must be in 
consonance with the constitutional scheme of India.  
The Bill proposes to collect DNA from the person pursuant to his consent.107 However, 
under the Indian constitutional scheme fundamental rights are inviolable and cannot be 
relinquished or waived by any individual.108 Inviolability of fundamental rights is a non-negotiable 
facet of the Indian Constitution. Thus, the State cannot set a procedure established by law 
according to which an individual’s consent may form the basis for ingression into the genetic 
privacy of the people. In other words, the legislature cannot legislate such law whereby, merely 
through individual consent a person can be authorised to forgo or relinquish his right to privacy, 
as well as allowing the collection of his bodily sample and the retention of his DNA (an 
individual’s biological makeup consisting his most sensitive and private information). Such a 
procedure established by law violates the Indian constitutional scheme, since individual consent 
cannot be the basis for the relinquishment of fundamental rights. Legislation of such procedure 
would destroy the fundamental scheme of the constitution and inviolability of fundamental rights. 
The Parliament being the creature of the Constitution is the recipient of limited amending power 
over fundamental rights from the Constituent assembly, which cannot enact such a procedure that 
changes the fundamental and core scheme for maintenance of inviolability of fundamental rights. 
The proposed legislative provisions concerning bodily samples collection from an individual 
pursuant to his consent thus appear to violate the Indian Constitution. 
4.3 Jurisdiction of Courts 
The Bill does not provide an effective and functional remedy to appeal against collection, 
retention and use of DNA Profile of a person. Further, it prohibits courts from dealing with matters 
over which the DNA Regulatory Board is empowered to take decisions.109 The right to life and 
personal liberty confers the right to defend genetic privacy against any intrusion, when read with 
the Right to human dignity and the Right to privacy,110 Moreover, recognition of the Right to 
 
106 Constitutional of India 1949, art.21. 
107 DNA Technology (Use and Application) Regulation Bill, s 21 and 22. 
108 Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 123, (1955) 57 BOMLR 575, 1955 CriLJ 215, 
1955 1 SCR 613; Basheshar Nath v. CIT 1959 AIR 149, 1959 SCR Supl (1) 528; S. Padmavathy v. The Registrar 
General W.P.No.12346 of 2016 
109 DNA Technology (Use and Regulation) Bill 2019, s 57. 
110 Grant or recognition of a right automatically authorises the grant or recognition of the right to effectively defend 





privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21, automatically entitles individuals to approach the 
High Court and Supreme Court under Articles 32 and 226 of the constitution in case of any 
proscribed collection, retention or use of DNA Profile. The doctrine of judicial review is the basic 
structure of the Indian Constitution and cannot be restricted over breaches of fundamental rights.111  
Though, the Bill grants several rights to people but fails to provide necessary means to 
enforce those rights. Thus, it must enable courts to empower people to- 
 File appeal for the removal of DNA record or breach of any right; 
 Enforce or redress their legal rights, in case of their violation or non-
compliance by the Board or other authority; 
 Challenge unauthorised collection, retention and use of DNA sample from 
their body or any other place (like DNA extraction from hairs collected 
from a barbershop), etc.  
Justice A.P. Shah’s committee report recommended for the right to redressal and appeal 
against the retention of DNA records.112 Right to redressal against the extraction of genetic 
information constitutes the fundamentally irreducible contingency necessary for the exercise of 
the Right to privacy guaranteed to the people. Following the recognition of the right to privacy, 
the state is constitutionally bound to ensure that a procedure established by law depriving anyone’s 
privacy must provide adequate and effective means to defend, redress and fight against any form 
of deprivation of privacy, including collection of DNA sample. The procedure established by law 
sanctioning human DNA collection but, deficient in guaranteeing people, effectual means and 
Right to defend against the collection of DNA is not reasonable and non-arbitrary. Thus, failing to 
pass the test of arbitrariness and reasonableness, it is deemed to be unconstitutional. 
4.4 Excessive Delegation of Power 
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The Bill grants extensive powers and delegates significant procedural and substantive 
functions to the board which ideally lie with the legislature or judicial institutions.113 The Supreme 
Court in Subramaniam Swamy v. Director, CBI114 ruled that excessive delegation of powers 
conferring unguided powers on the executive would violate Article 14 of the Constitution 
resulting, the law susceptible to being struck down.115 Furthermore, the Bill does not provide for 
any effective mechanism to ensure accountability or oversight over the functioning of a DNA 
Regulatory Board. However, any statute that seeks to establish a regulatory mechanism must 
explicate limits within which such regulation is carried out.116 If a statute seeks to empower the 
executive, it must necessarily define restraints of such power. 
Thus, it is imperative to incorporate provisions to ensure effective accountability and 
oversight of the DNA Regulatory Board towards the Parliament. Absence of accountability, 
transparency, and oversight over the functioning of the regulatory institution, regulating the affairs 
of genetic privacy (DNA profiling, including collecting, indexing, accessing, and storing DNA 
profiles) amounts to arbitrariness and unreasonableness, which violate Article 14 of the 
Constitution. 
4.5 Sharing of DNA Profiles with Foreign States  
The Bill permits the Union Government to share DNA profiles with other countries.117 The 
flourishing transnational mobility in today’s world enables criminal activities to surpass national 
boundaries. Modern technologies for the fast flow of information and sharing of data can facilitate 
criminals expanding the scope of their criminal activities. Therefore, it is peremptory to establish 
and encourage international cooperation in crime detection, enabling easy exchange of scientific 
& technical knowledge and expertise to deal with new forms of crime in the modern genetic age. 
However, it is necessary to ensure the constitutional permissibility for the sharing of DNA profiles 
concerning the right to privacy of people. The State cannot share DNA profiles of any individuals 
with another state through any legislative prescription or otherwise. The Bill must reflect a 
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legislative proscription over sharing of DNA profiles. The scope of sharing must be limited, only 
to the extent of informing the result of DNA comparison. 
4.6 Standardization of DNA Testing 
Standardisation of DNA Testing is indispensable to assure courts and general masses over 
the quality and credibility of DNA tests. 118  It is necessary to establish a universal standard for 
DNA testing and devising a universal testing protocol (including standard operating procedure) 
for all DNA testing labs. Human DNA consists of two regions, a coding and a non-coding 
region.119 
The coding region is the minor part (10%) and consists of genes which provide details 
concerning physical traits, susceptibility to disease, allergies and other intricate details of a 
person.120 While the functions of the non-coding region (90%) are not known further, it does not 
contain such genetic details.121 However, it has higher variability in its structure than the coding 
region between two individuals.122 To this sense, in order to protect the privacy of DNA profiles, 
international standards in DNA profiling is restricted to the non-coding region of DNA only.123 
However, the Bill does not propose any such legislative restriction over the procedure for DNA 
profiling. Thus, legislative embargo to limit DNA profiling over the non-coding region is 
fundamentally indispensable. 
4.7 Sources for DNA Profile Collection  
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DNA evidence is a mighty tool to exculpate the innocent and trace the guilty. Only until 
recently did DNA fingerprinting necessitate either blood or  semen from some form of a tissue, 
which is not required anymore.124 Just as it is probable, with a little innovation, to extract suspects’ 
fingerprints, without voluntary submission by the subject, so too is it straightforward for 
investigators to obtain DNA samples from hair, skin brushings or saliva (e.g., from cigarette butts 
or spoons and forks).125 This ability to secure access to a person’s genetic description arguably 
advances the necessity to protect individual privacy rights and restrict its access from others. 
Therefore, the exercise of DNA sample extraction for DNA profiling warrants a modernistic 
reconceptualisation of rights and liberties. 
The Bill must set   an explicit legislative proscription to collect DNA from sources other 
than those provided within the Bill, Even though, it lists sources for collection of DNA samples,126 
yet, it allows additions to the list through regulations and not legislative amendments. An 
individual’s privacy cannot be contingent upon future regulations, especially when it concerns 
something as sensitive as DNA. Since the nature of the information collected is so intrinsically 
connected to individual identity, absence of legislative proscription against sources for sample 
collection can make the law susceptible to future misuse and abuse. Thus, the legislature must not 
delegate such significantly critical power to safeguard liberty and genetic privacy of people. 
Additions to the sources for DNA sample collection must happen, only through the legislative 
sanction of Union Parliament each time.  It would enable in restraining the possible misuse of 
DNA evidence in criminal cases by the State. Since it would not let the State expand sources for 
collection of DNA sample as per its discretion. 
4.8 Time Frame for Storage of DNA Data 
The Bill does not delineate a time frame for the removal of DNA Profiles from DNA data 
banks. It entails storing DNA data recovered from the crime scene in perpetuity, since its removal 
is sine qua non to police reports and court order.127 The materialities of Indian criminal 
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administration unveil wide incongruities in arrest and consequent convictions.128 Therefore, 
removal of DNA profiles conditional to the court order or police report would virtually amount to 
indefinite retention of DNA profiles. Thus, databanks are likely to be lopsided and encompass 
profiles of people who are presumed innocent before the law for an indefinite period. Such 
retention of DNA profile censoriously violates Right to privacy and Right of control over personal 
information. No constitutional justification exists to satisfy the inclusion of DNA profiles in 
databanks in such cases. 
Most DNA data regulation laws globally provide a time frame for storage of DNA data. 
The Canadian Supreme Court in R. v. R.C.129 ruled the retention of DNA data as grossly 
disproportionate.130 It should be born in mind that when the liberty and genetic privacy of the 
person is at stake the answer of the legislature cannot be ‘as specified by regulation’.131 Therefore, 
the Bill must set a definite time frame for removal of DNA profiles from DNA data banks and not 
leave it to the future regulations by executive or discretion of the DNA Regulatory Board. 
4.9 Religion and Caste Based Profiling 
As discussed earlier, DNA usage is not limited to crime detection. It is an individual's 
unique identifier, which may leak critically sensitive and most secret information about the person 
without limitations or protections.132 For instance, access to such intrusive information could be 
abused to attack people based on their caste and religion, since specific caste or religious group 
could be wrongly associated with criminal or such other activities.  
Analysing the oppressive history of various social groups, the Bill must consider the socio-
political realities of Indian society. The crime data illustrates that vulnerable groups and gender & 
religious minorities have been disproportionally immured in criminal cases. While conviction rates 
have remained low, the majority of those arrested belonged to just three communities: Dalits, 
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Muslims and Adivasis.133 Thus, the proposed Bill may impact on marginalised communities (like 
Dalits, Adivasis) including, gender and religious minorities could be intensely oppressive and 
gruesome. The Bill can facilitate targeted prejudice and discrimination against such groups, which 
will have detrimental impact over the fundamental fabrics of communal harmony; social justice; 
fraternity, and human dignity. The legislature cannot legislate laws which attempt to alter the 
fundamental character and founding pillars of Indian society. Therefore, the State must adopt 
stringent safeguards to ensure that implicit predispositions of the criminal-administration do not 
influence the integrity of databanks. 
4.10 Security Infrastructure for DNA Profiles 
DNA testing technology has critical ramifications over the privacy of Indian Citizens. IT 
Rules 2011 classifies DNA data as sensitive data.134 The number of those arrested in India is 
gigantic.135 Consequently, the size of DNA databanks will be a voluminous consolidated collation 
of citizen’s biological information, thus, establishing a massive genetic intelligence database. Even 
a small breach in information could render many people vulnerable. The Bill, therefore, must be 
legislated only after considering the security of DNA profiles storage. Stringent security 
arrangements including stern oversight mechanism for databanks is indispensable for securing 
individual emancipation, national security from external attacks and internal sabotage. Inadequate 
safeguards and security arrangements for DNA profiles from possible data breaches would not 
only increase data breach incidents from DNA databanks (violating Right to privacy of people) 
but, censoriously affect India’s sovereign and security interests. Thus, the adequacy of security 
infrastructure to secure the most sensitive genetic data of an individual is fundamentally 
indispensable before the enactment of the proposed DNA legislation. 
 
133 Deeptiman Tiwary, 'NCRB Data: Higher Share Of Dalits, Tribals, Muslims In Prison Than Numbers Outside' (The 
Indian Express (2020)) <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/ncrb-data-higher-share-of-dalits-tribals-muslims-in-
prison-than-numbers-outside-6575446/> accessed 21 February 2021; Anmol Saxena , 'India: More than half of 
undertrials are Dalits, Muslims and tribals’ (Aljazeera (2016)) <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2016/11/1/india-
more-than-half-of-undertrials-are-dalits-muslims-and-tribals> accessed 25 February 2021; Rajya Sabha (n 117) 46; 
India spend, 'India’s Jail Stats: 7 In 10 Undertrials, 1 In 3 Dalit/Adivasi ' (BloombergQuint 
(2020)) <https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/indias-jail-stats-7-in-10-undertrials-1-in-3-
dalitadivasi> accessed 25 February 2021. 
134 Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or 
Information) Rules 2011, Rule 3 r/w Rule 2(1)(b). 
135 Read Asaduddin Owaisi to Mr. Jairam Ramesh, “Revised Dissent Note for the Committee's Report on DNA 






The DNA Technology Bill poses a direct threat to the Right to life and personal liberty of 
the people if enacted in the current form. Though there are no in-principal differences over the 
notion of regulating DNA profiling technology, the prevailing manifestations of the Bill attempt 
to disparagingly aggress the rights and liberties of the people. Besides, the retention of DNA 
profiles by the State involves critical concerns over privacy, liberty and freedom of the people. 
Therefore, one must consider the exploitative vulnerability of DNA profiles and the privacy of 
people. Additionally, the advantageous exploitation of technology must not be at the cost of the 
privacy of Indian citizens. It is exigent to ensure that the proposed legislation does not create a 
surveillance state which would oppose the democratic constitutional ecosystem of our country. 
The State cannot privilege institutional reforms over fundamental rights. 
The Bill causes precarious risks over unbridled ingress into the critically sensitive genetic 
information of people. The scope of DNA profiling shall be limited only to criminal cases before 
the enactment of the proposed DNA legislation. While there appears to be a convincing argument 
in favour of DNA databases for convicts, who, as recurrent wrongdoers, will be traceable quickly, 
there is no legal or moral ground for retaining DNA in other categories of the population, given 
the extraordinary potential for abuse. Moreover, the necessity for preserving DNA profiles for civil 
matters without a clear and separate index is ambiguous, as it evidently outrages the fundamental 
right to privacy and does not serve any public purpose. Access to intrusive genetic information 
through DNA profiling of such a large category of people can lead to caste and religion-based 
profiling which can erode the fundamental character of religious tolerance and communal harmony 
enrooted in the Indian society. The Parliament has an implied restriction and prohibition to 
legislate such laws, the implementation of which can alter the fundamental character of the Indian 
society. 
The proposed DNA Bill is premature in the absence of a data protection law. The legislature 
must pass a robust data protection legislation before the enactment of the proposed DNA Bill. Such 
legislation would be instrumental in protecting the genetic privacy of people. The Bill alludes 
consent in different provisions, yet in all of these, the magistrate can readily override such assent, 
thereby making consent perfunctory. Furthermore, the Bill does not provide any legislative 





when the magistrate should abrogate consent, which could turn into a fatal flaw. Additionally, the 
Bill fails to provide necessary protection to ensure free, fair, voluntary and well-informed consent. 
Absence of legislative safeguards makes the Bill deficient in terms of reasonability, fairness and 
consitutionability. Extraction of one’s DNA sample (or consent thereto) through coercive means 
would indisputably violate the Right to privacy and Right against self-incrimination of an 
individual. The legislature is duty-bound to ensure that while abridging an individual's 
fundamental right, it provides effective legislative means to such individual in order to defend and 
protect such abridgement of his fundamental right. Though the Bill proposes the legislative scheme 
to extract DNA following the person’s consent, it outrages the primary rule of inviolability of 
fundamental rights enrooted in the Indian Constitution. Extraction of an individual’s DNA for 
DNA profiling unquestionably amounts to infringement of the fundamental right to privacy. 
Therefore, such abridgement must be inconsonance with the Constitution of India. Inviolability of 
fundamental rights is the fundamental scheme of the India Constitution. Hence, the Bill violates 
the fundamental principles of the Indian Constitution. 
The Bill would establish an ecosystem for constructive use and application of DNA 
profiling when forensic investigators in India are proficient at using such technology. The 
government must focus on the capacity building measures to implement the proposed legislation 
with utmost effectiveness. In must train forensic investigators and raise resilient mechanism to 
protect and prevent data breaches from DNA data banks and laboratories. Law enforcement 
agencies and others must be trained to use DNA evidence credibly. This will enable the agencies 
and courts to determine the limitations and to identify the appropriate usage of DNA in each case, 
thereby minimising possible errors. Further, the agencies must be trained to protect against DNA 
data breaches. Additionally, they must be proficient in expeditiously solving incidents of DNA 
data breaches. It is quite possible that in this information age, complex technological methods may 
be employed to execute the data breaches from DNA storage. Thus, agencies must be equipped to 
handle such cases and trace wrongdoer expeditiously and not allow cases to go into cold storage. 
Moreover, with the introduction of institutional DNA profiling in criminal cases, frequent 
instances of planting fabricated DNA at crime scenes may occur.136 Thus, investigation agencies 
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must train themselves to solve such cases, while ensuring due protection of the innocent whose 
DNA may be implanted fraudulently at the crime scene. 
The Bill delegates extensive legislative and administrative powers to the DNA Regulatory 
Board. It proposes to create a statutory institution armed with wide critical powers without assuring 
institutional independence from the government. Delegation of extensive powers to any authority 
is inconsistent to the Constitutional scheme of India. The Bill authorises the Board to establish 
critical DNA profiling regulations through regulations and not legislative amendments. It is 
important to understand that, when the fundamentals of freedom, liberty and privacy of the people  
are at stake the legislative enactments of the parliament cannot say “as specified by regulations”. 
Thus, the legislature cannot delegate critical legislative functions which directly impact freedom 
and liberty of the people to any authority. 
The successful implementation of DNA fingerprinting with a firm security mechanism 
protecting the DNA data storage could facilitate the judicial system and effectuate crime control 
in India. However, we must assess the technology’s advantages against threats over privacy. While 
the use of DNA profiling technology in a particular case with due limitations is acceptable, the 
retention of DNA profiles of a large category of people is the core issue making their privacy 
vulnerable to exploitation. 
The Indian Constitution represents the Charter of power granted by liberty not the Charter 
of liberty granted by power.137 DNA is a convincing testimony, particularly in criminal forensics, 
however, ingress into a person’s genetic information can be devilishly intrusive and threatening. 
The State cannot implement reforms at the detriment of the fundamental rights of the people. The 
Bill causes a risk to the right to privacy of people 138 and appears to violate the fundamental 
character of the Constitution. It threatens to fundamentally erode the fabrics of fraternity and 
democracy in India through the fear of genetic surveillance and state invasion into genetic privacy. 
The State is constitutionally bound to protect and preserve the fundamental rights guaranteed under 
the Constitution. To that sense, the Bill presently violates fundamental rights and the basic 
structure of the Indian Constitution. It has the potential to cause irreparable damage to the liberty 
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and privacy of the citizens. Therefore, it must be reviewed while considering the fundamentals of 
constitutional principles and values, discipline, morality and ethos in India. 
